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Abstract
The issue of price transmission along the food chain has attracted considerable
interest in the EU because of the welfare and policy implications that could
potentially be generated. Possible consumer welfare loss may exist if price increases
are rapidly transmitted through the supply chain, while price decreases are
transmitted more slowly, or incompletely. Pasta is a strategic product in the Italian
agro-food industry. In the last years, among the events which have characterized the
Italian pasta supply chain such as CAP reform and prices instability, a case of
anticompetitive practices against pasta makers was identified and sanctioned by the
Italian Antitrust Authority for the period between October 2006 and, at least, March
2008. Specifically, based on Antitrust sentence Italian pasta makers (about 90% of
Italian market) and two Industrial Unions of Italian pasta makers have put into
practice a restrictive-competition accord aimed at harmonizing increases in the sale
price for semolina dry pasta that applies to the retail sector. Our goal is to investigate
whether antitrust sentence has produced some substantial effects in the Italian pasta
market by restoring a state of appreciable competitiveness among companies.
A useful way to analyze pasta makers' behavior, before and after antitrust sentence,
is to investigate whether and how the mechanism of the transmission price,
specifically the pasta producer price adjustment process to semolina price variations,
was changed with antitrust intervention.
We use Kinnucan and Forker model which has been employed in literature for
analyzing the impact of a policy intervention on farm-to-retail price transmission in
the fluid milk market.
The results showed that antitrust intervention would seem have produced some
substantial effects in the Italian pasta market by restoring a state of high competition
among companies.
Background
Vertical price transmission along the food chain has attracted considerable interest in the
EU (Commission of the European Communities 2009) because of the welfare and policy
implications that could potentially be generated. Perfect transmission of price shocks
occurs when changes in prices at a given level of the chain are fully and instantaneously
transmitted to the other stages. Therefore, if price increases are more rapidly and com-
pletely transmitted through the supply chain than price decrease, then, possible consumer
welfare loss may exist (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel 2004; Vavra and Goodwin 2005).
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Among the possible factors that may explain the presence of asymmetries in price trans-
mission along a food chain, many authors suggest the exercise of market power at the
processing and retailing stage (Peltzman 2000; Lloyd et al. 2006).
Pasta is a strategic product in the Italian agro-food industry since Italy has the peculi-
arity of being, at the same time, the main producer and consumer of pasta. During the
last several years, wheat-pasta chains have been strongly affected by some changes. For
example, CAP reforms in the durum wheat sector have progressively reduced govern-
ment intervention in the market. Furthermore, starting in the spring of 2007 until
March 2008, durum wheat prices have increased sharply causing important costs in-
creases for the semolina and pasta maker stages. Finally, a case of anticompetitive prac-
tices against pasta makers was identified and sanctioned by the Italian Antitrust
Authority for the period between October 2006 and, at least, March 2008 (Antitrust
2009). Specifically, based on Antitrust sentence Italian pasta makers (about 90 % of all
firms in the Italian market) and two Industrial Unions of Italian pasta makers have put
into practice a restrictive-competition accord aimed at harmonizing increases in the
sale price for semolina dry pasta that applies to the retail sector.
Research on evaluating competition policy has grown rapidly in the last 10–20 years
with a number of surveys in which critical overviews of the methodology are used to
evaluate the effectiveness of Competition Authority decisions (Davies and Ormosi
2010; Davies 2010; Bergman 2008; Werden 2008). Only recently, since the spring of
2006, the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) started paying attention to the evalu-
ation of the impact of its decisions, by establishing a new unit in charge of this task
(Sabbatini 2008). The estimation of the effects of Competition Authority intervention is
usually realized by analyzing the price variations and by estimating the margins, con-
sumer surplus and, recently, total welfare (Sabbatini 2008; Aguzzoni 2011). Few studies
on ICA decisions reveal that in some cases the investigation and the fines produce
beneficial deterrent effects on firms’ behavior such as in “baby milk” case (Sabbatini
2008), while in other cases, differently from what was expected by policy makers and
consumers associations, the authority intervention does not produce price decreases as
in the Italian pay-toll highways refueling market (Aguzzoni 2011).
In our idea, the pricing behavior of Italian pasta makers might presumably be scruti-
nized by investigating on how producers have transmitted semolina price variations
into pasta price. A useful way to analyze pasta makers’ behavior, before and after anti-
trust sentence, is to investigate whether and how the mechanism of the transmission
price, specifically the pasta producer price adjustment process to semolina price varia-
tions, was changed with antitrust decision.
Our goal is to investigate whether antitrust intervention has produced some substan-
tial effects in the Italian pasta market by restoring a state of appreciable competition
among firms in terms of price transmission.
Methods
Among the various models of the asymmetric price transmission methodology, we employed
Kinnucan and Forker (1987), which has been used in literature for analyzing the impact of a
policy intervention on farm-to-retail price transmission in the fluid milk market (Lass 2005).
In the pass-through between semolina and pasta producer price the specification
model assumes the following form:
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πfi SFt−i þ δ Ct þ εt ð1Þ
Where PAt is the accumulated change in pasta producer price, T is a time trend vari-
able, SRt ¼ SR1
Xt−1
i¼0
Max Δ St−i ; 0ð Þ measures the accumulated increases in semolina
price up to period t, while SFt ¼ SF1
Xt−1
i¼0
Min Δ St−i ; 0ð Þ measures the accumulated
decreases in semolina price up to period t, with Δ St = St − St − i which represents
the changes of semolina price. Moreover, following Kinnucan and Forker (1987) and
Lass (2005) we include Ct which symbolizes the other costs faced by pasta makers such
as labour and energy in order to capture all costs which affect pasta price; finally, εt is a sto-
chastic disturbance. The semolina-pasta model is presented in a completely general form,
which allows different numbers of lagged values to be incorporated. This implies that pasta
producer price could respond differently to rising and falling semolina prices with respect
to both the magnitude and speed. In effect, the different superscripts on the summation
term of increasing (M1) and decreasing (M2) variables allows that price transmission does
not necessarily require the same number of lags for the two different components.
Neither theory nor empirical studies suggest the exact number of lagged values to in-
clude in both models, therefore, we proceeded to evaluate different structures in terms
of lags and chosen the model that best fits the data (Lass 2005; Capps and Sherwell
2007; Cacchiarelli and Sorrentino, 2013). In the semolina-pasta model, we determined
that the best lag structure incorporates the current period and three lagged prices both
for increasing and decreasing components.
In this study the main focus is to identify the presence of asymmetries in price trans-
mission between the two selected stages of the pasta chain. To determine whether
pasta producer price responds in an asymmetric way to semolina price changes, we
conduct two different tests:
H0 : π
r















Hypothesis test (2) is sometimes referred to as short-run tests of asymmetry and was
performed on the individual parameters. This hypothesis focuses on the equality of
transmission rates during the same period for increasing and decreasing upstream
prices. In the second hypothesis test shown in Eq. (3), all lagged variables are incorpo-
rated both for increasing and decreasing components of the model to test whether the
pasta prices return to same level after equivalent increases and decreases in the semo-
lina prices. This type of test is referred as of long-run asymmetry.
Data and preliminary analysis
We employed monthly data provided by Istituto di Servizi per il Mercato Agricolo Ali-
mentare (ISMEA) and the National Institute for Statistics (Istat). Data concern prices
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of semolina and pasta producer and cost indexes as labour and energy from January
2005 to August 2013 for Italy.
Fig. 1 shows the general movement of semolina and pasta prices in the selected period.
Before 2007, the data indicate a slight alternating trend, where short upward movements are
followed by smooth downward periods. On July 2007, there is a considerable increase re-
corded first in semolina price and, afterwards, in pasta price. Then, beginning March 2008
the semolina prices reversed the trend and returned to the level at which they began their
rather dramatic increases, while the pasta price reduction was started some month later.
We used Granger-causality tests in order to verify the direction of price transmission.
The results1 show that semolina price causes pasta price while pasta price does not
affect semolina price.
After having conducted a preliminary test2 to determine whether structural change in
the price transmission occurred with prices instability and antitrust intervention we
split dataset into two periods: January 2005-August 2008 (Pre-Antitrust intervention)
and September 2008-August 2013 (Post-Antitrust intervention) (Table 1).
Finally, we conducted tests on stationarity and cointegration of the time series employed
in the model. According to Granger and Newbold (1974), running an Ordinary Least
Square with non-stationary variables could lead to spurious results and Capps and
Sherwell (2007) and Bolotova and Novakovic (2012) argue that pre-cointegration
approach such as Kinnucan and Forker model might not be the best one to be used in the
situations where data exhibit non-stationarity properties. Specifically, two alternative tests,
the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS)
test, were used to determine whether the time series were stationary while for cointegra-
tion tests we employed the Johansen (1991) procedure. The results show that variables in
the models were non-stationary and cointegrated (Table 2).
Results and discussion
The models were estimated by generalized least-squares using Prais-Winsten methods
due to serial correlation of the errors. As we mentioned above, some authors (Capps
and Sherwell 2007; Bolotova and Novakovic 2012) argue that pre-cointegration
approach such as Kinnucan and Forker model might not be the best one to be used in
the situations where data exhibit non-stationarity properties. They suggest that in the

















Fig. 1 Semolina and pasta producer prices from January 2005 to August 2013
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(ECM) might be a superior alternative to pre-cointegration models. However, after
having estimated both Kinnucan and Forker and ECM model to analyze the price
transmission before and after antitrust authority intervention, we concluded that the
results were essentially statistically similar3 as occurred for the most part of cases
(Capps and Sherwell 2007; Bolotova and Novakovic 2012).
As a consequence, only the estimates of the first model are reported in Table 3. In the
Pre-Antitrust intervention period, the model presents a fast upward adjustment of pasta
producer price in response to semolina price increases. The current period effect is statis-
tically significant at the one percent level of significance and is the coefficient estimated
with the greatest magnitude. In the subsequent three months, the first and the third show
negligible and insignificant downward movements while the second an additional in-
crease, significant at the ten percent level. The semolina price decreases are transmitted
more slowly on pasta price than increases. While the current period presents a positive
and insignificant coefficient the first month is characterized by a significant and wide up-
ward movement (negative coefficient). The last two months conclude the price transmis-
sion with a large and statistically significant downward correction. Finally, the processing
cost increases were estimated to have no statistically significant effects on pasta price. In
the Post-Antitrust intervention period, the results show a great difference in the pasta
price adjustment process to semolina price changes when compared to the Pre-Antitrust
intervention model. In particular, the effect of price increases is overall negligible while
Table 2 Johansen trace test for cointegration
Rank Jan 2005-Aug 2008 Sep 2008 -Sept 2013
<= 3.15a 4.32a
0 20.35 18.45
aStatistically different from zero at 1 %
Table 1 Stationarity tests
Jan 2005-Aug 2008 Sept 2008-Sept 2013
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS
Pasta price −2.088 0.485b −1.597 0.515b
Rising semolina price
Current 0.162 0.964a 1.096 1.068a
One month 0.176 0.939a 2.652 2.029a
Two month 0.193 0.911a 2.680 2.035a
Three month 0.237 0.883a 2.690 2.038a
Falling semolina price
Current 0.665 1.041a 0.947 0.647a
One month 0.254 0.698b 1.191 0.641b
Two month 0.741 0.821a 0.976 0.635b
Three month 0.743 0.938a 1.050 1.141a
Other costs
Labour 2.901 0.948a 1.111 1.718a
Energy 1.711 0.908a −0.515 0.463b
In ADF test, hypothesis null is unit root while in KPSS is stationarity
aStatistically different from zero at 1 %; bStatistically different from zero at 5 %
In ADF test, hypothesis null is unit root while in KPSS is stationarity
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the sum of falling coefficients indicates that, on the whole, pasta makers incorporate
semolina price decreases with a greater intensity than in the previous period.
A useful way to illustrate pasta producer price response is to capture the accumulated
current and lagged effects, holding all other effects constant, by simulating equivalent
semolina price increases and decreases (Fig. 2). Since these simulations do not take into
account statistical significance of the coefficients, they do not assume any statistical
Table 3 Estimated Pre-Antitrust sentence and Post-Antitrust sentence pasta producer price models
Jan 2005-Aug 2008 Sept 2008-Sept 2013
Estimate t Estimate t
Rising semolina price coefficients
Current 0.768 5.48a −0.417 −3.57a
One month −0.016 −0.110 0.219 1.91c
Two month 0.591 3.92a −0.063 −0.530
Three month −0.029 −0.190 0.300 2.62b
Falling semolina price coefficients
Current 0.493 1.52 −0.137 −0.68
One month −2.737 −6.81a 0.712 3.2a
Two month 0.891 1.95c 0.199 0.92
Three month 1.642 4.22a 0.009 0.06
Other costs
Labour −0.002 −0.990 0.000 −0.500
Energy 0.000 0.380 0.000 0.260
Trend −0.001 −1.81c 0.004 3.37a
Aggregate lagged effect
Sum of rising coefficient 1.314 0.039
Sum of falling coefficient 0.288 0.783
Differcenced 1.026 3.61a −0.745 3.65a
R2 0.92 0.88
Durbin-Watson 1.88 1.67
Sample size 44 60
aStatistically different from zero at 1 %; bStatistically different from zero at 5 %; cStatistically different from zero at 10 %







































Fig. 2 Estimated effect on pasta producer price of an equivalent semolina price increase and decrease
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significance but they exclusively represent a preliminary indication of pasta makers’
behavior which will be statistically tested below (Table 3).
An initial pasta producer price of €1.00 per kilo is assumed. After two months, we
assume a semolina price increase of €0.10 per kilo and allow these effects to fully
impact the pasta producer prices without introducing any other changes until the sixth
month (this allows all estimated lagged increases to fully impact the semolina price).
For the Pre-Antitrust intervention period, in the current period pasta price increases to
€1.078 per kilo, followed by a slight downward movement, a further but less marked
raise and a another imperceptible decrease. Thus, by considering the net effect of about
€0.13 we can argue that the transmission rate of a semolina price increase on pasta
price was about 130 %. After the adjustment process was complete, we introduce an
equivalent reduction of €0.10 per kilo on semolina price. As a result, the final pasta
producer price fails to return to the initial level remaining at about €1.10 per kilo. For
comparison purpose, we set up the same simulation in the Post-Antitrust intervention
period. In this case, the pasta price adjustment to semolina price increase produces a
price of 1.004 with a transmission rate of 0.4 % (Fig. 2).
Next, we examine the impact of a semolina price decrease of €0.10. The final result
was €0.93 per kilo, which is lower than the initial pasta price. The aggregate partial
analysis provides an interesting comparison of the two periods, with a strong indication
of positive long-run asymmetry in the Pre-Antitrust intervention period, which then
moves to an evidence of negative asymmetry after Antitrust Authority intervention.
The next step is to test, by conducting F-test of the equality between the estimated pa-
rameters for increasing and decreasing prices, whether the observed asymmetric price
transmission behavior we found for pasta producer prices are statistically significant.
As we mentioned above, we apply two different hypothesis tests (the results are
reported in Table 3). In the first test (short-run asymmetry), the null hypothesis is the
equality of transmission speed of adjustment during the same period for upstream price
increases and decreases. The second test, referred to as long-run asymmetry, provides
statistical evidence about whether downstream price returns to the same level after
equivalent upstream price increases and decreases. Regarding short-run asymmetry test
we found some evidences exclusively in the Pre-sentence period while after antitrust
intervention, the transmission speed of adjustment during the same period for up-
stream price increases and decreases is statistically equal. The results of the second test
show that in both periods we reject the long-run symmetry null hypothesis. This allows
us to confirm that: i) there is a statistical evidence, at 1 % of level of significance, that
net changes in prices was greater following equivalent increases and decreases in semolina
prices before the intervention of Italian antitrust; ii) after antitrust authority action, there
is a statistical evidence, at 1 % of level of significance, that, after an equivalent increases
and decreases in upstream prices, the final price is lower than its initial level (Table 4).
Conclusions
Pasta is a strategic product in the Italian agro-food industry. In the last years, among
the events which have characterized the Italian pasta supply chain such as CAP reform
and prices instability, a case of anticompetitive practices against pasta makers was iden-
tified and sanctioned by the Italian Antitrust Authority.
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Our goal was to investigate whether antitrust intervention has produced some sub-
stantial effects in the Italian pasta market by restoring a state of appreciable competi-
tion among firms.
A useful way to analyze pasta makers’ behavior, before and after antitrust intervention,
was to investigate whether and how the mechanism of the transmission price, specifically
the pasta producer price adjustment process to semolina price variations, was changed.
The empirical analysis showed interesting changes to price transmission in the pasta mar-
ket with the antitrust intervention. While in the Pre-Intervention period the effects of semo-
lina price decreases on producer pasta price were much lower in magnitude than the effects
of increases, after Antitrust Authority action pasta producer price responded to semolina in-
creases in a completely different way by incorporating only a minimum part of the cost rises
of the raw material. Furthermore, the effect of semolina decreases on producer pasta price
was greater than that shown before of the Authority action. Therefore, the net effect was
negative because of the price increases that were lower than price decreases.
The long-run asymmetry tests confirm, respectively, a positive asymmetric price
transmission in the first period (2005-Aug 2008) and a negative asymmetric adjustment
of pasta producer price in response to semolina price changes in the second (Sept
2008-Aug 2013) one.
Consequently, the analysis of the price transmission has showed that antitrust interven-
tion would seem have produced some substantial effects in the Italian pasta market by
restoring a state of high competition among companies. This result is in line with part of
the previous literature (Sabbatini 2008) on the effectiveness of authority intervention on
markets in which collusion among firms is investigated and fined. However, among the
reasons which could have pushed firms to a higher competition, it is important to con-
sider that in the last years, as suggested by Cacchiarelli, Lass and Sorrentino (2016), in
Italian pasta supply chain the role played by retailers is decisively more important. In fact,
retailers, entering pasta market through private labels, have improved their bargaining
power toward pasta makers. Based on the last sentences, it is worthwhile to briefly under-
line the importance of competition law in the food supply chain which connects sectors
with a very articulated structure. The agricultural sector is characterized by highly frag-
mented production while the market structure in processing and retailing stages is much
more concentrated (EU 2009; Russo et al. 2011). This often allows processors and retailers
to exert their potential market power to extract rent from government interventions sus-
taining farmers by different forms of subsidies (Russo et al. 2011; Sexton 2013). Therefore,
for an effective antitrust policy it is crucial both the monitoring activities of antitrust
Table 4 Hypothesis testsb of asymmetric pasta producer price response for Pre-Antitrust and
Post-Antitrust
Period Jan 2005-Aug 2008 Sept 2008-Aug 2013
Rising semolina price coefficient vs
falling semolina price coefficient
Current 0.54 1.51
1st month 39.2a 2.79
2nd month 0.38 1.46
3rd month 15.41a 0.21
Sum of rising coefficients vs
sum of falling coefficients
13.09a 13.33a
aStatistically different from zero at level of significance 1 %;
bTests were conducted as F-test of the equality between the estimated parameters for increasing upstream prices and
decreasing upstream prices
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authority and the measures of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which can be
successful in rebalancing the market power among the sectors of the agro-food chains. In
effect, although national antitrust authorities can intervene, as we demonstrated in this
paper, by restoring a state of competition among companies this is not sufficient to pre-
vent anti-competitive conducts. This goal can be reached through a policy which might
improve the bargaining power of farmers. In this direction, we consider very useful the
measures of the 2013 CAP Reform to strengthen and extend the role for Producer Organ-
isation and Interbrunch Organisation in all agricultural sectors for their capability to
concentrate producers’ supply and provide alternative marketing channels with more
balanced contracts and transactions.
Endnotes
1Granger-causality tests were conducted on the original time series to obtain Wald
statistics for the hypothesis that all coefficients on the lags of explanatory variables were
jointly zero in the equation for the dependent variable. In order to choose the lag struc-
ture in the VAR model preceding the causality test the SBC criterion was used. We
safely reject the hypothesis the semolina prices do not cause pasta prices while we fail
to reject the hypothesis that pasta prices do not cause semolina prices (the p-value was
0.927).
2In order to estimate the date of the structural break we employed “Gregory and
Hansen (1996)” is cited in text but not given in the reference list. Please provide details
in the list or delete the citation from the text. Gregory and Hansen (1996) method,
within the conventional Engle and Granger (1987) test, which allowed us to detect a
possible break in the long-run relationship of unknown date.
3The main results of the Asymmetric Error Correction model are: i) in the Pre-
Antitrust Sentence period, the positive error term was decisively statistically greater
than the negative error term indicating that in the long-run pasta makers transmitted
semolina increases while the decreases were not completely transmitted into pasta
prices; ii) after Antitrust intervention ECM results indicate that pasta makers, in the
long-run, have changed behavior transmitting with a greater magnitude the decreases
of semolina price. All results of ECM models are available upon request.
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